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THE EUROPEAN

FUTURES

OBSERVATORY

 

THE CLASH OF CIVILISATIONS

 

Samuel Huntington

 

ISBN 0-7432-3149-X

 

I came to this book through the recommendation of others. In our research for the America 2025 project, we continually bumped into references to the model laid out in this book. This made it important for us to consider the model, if only to use it as a base line in assessing the work undertaken by others. In turn, the model has been quite influential in the formation of foreign policy in recent years, particularly as it provides a metric whereby we can include the Islamic world. For this reason, it would be inappropriate for us not to consider a work of such influence.

 

The book is divided into five parts. The first part sets out the case for examining the world from a cultural perspective. Part two then considers the shifting balance of civilisations within the world. Part three extends this further by looking at the emerging order of civilisations in the world today, whilst part four examines the clashes of civilisations. Finally, part five takes a view of the future of civilisations.

 

In a world of nation-states, we are accustomed to think nationally. However, in the post-Cold War era, what matters most is cultural identity. Cultural identities, which broaden into civilisational identities, are shaping the patterns of international relations. International relations have become multi-polar and inter-civilisational. The key differences between people are cultural. Nation states remain the principal actors, but they resonate to a cultural stimulus. This is the main argument for viewing international relations in civilisational terms.

 

Within the world today, Huntington identifies seven key civilisations:

1. SINIC – a distinct Chinese civilisation.

2. JAPANESE – the Japanese civilisation as evolved from the Chinese civilisation.

3. HINDU – this dominates the Indian Sub-Continent.

4. ISLAMIC – this girdles the earth from North Africa to Indonesia.

5. ORTHODOX – this stretches from its core in Russia.

6. WESTERN – this encompasses Europe, North America, Latin America, Australia and New Zealand.

7.  AFRICAN – the Sub-Saharan continent.

The West presents two faces to the world – one of dominant triumphalism as the victor in the Cold War and one of decline as the influence of the West diminishes.

 

The education and urbanisation of non-Western countries has led to their rise relative to the West. This has been most pronounced with the rise of East Asian economies. However, the West still has the upper hand on developing new technologies. This is being eroded due to the impact of globalisation. The economic growth of East Asia has been one of the most significant developments of recent decades. The growth has spread to a wider range of nations than just Japan. Japan was the first of a number. The growing wealth of East Asia is increasingly used to demonstrate the superiority of Asian culture. Defeat in WWII provided a major cultural shock to Japan. However, the successful recovery of Japan and the failure of communism in Asia provided the paradigm for societies to follow. In China, the Communist Party chose a path of Ti-Yong (capitalism combined with political authoritarianism). The nationalism promoted by the party is Han Nationalism. There is a belief that the recent economic growth will continue indefinitely. It is seen as an essential by-product of the Asia culture. It is seen as the result of a collective rather than an individual approach to life.

 

At the same time, many Muslims are turning to Islam as a source of identity. The Islamic Resurgence is about modernisation without Westernisation. The Resurgence has had a political effect, but not in the heart of core nations. It represents a failure of liberal democracy to take hold in Muslim nations. The Islamic Resurgence is an attempt to come to terms with the impact of globalised modernisation. It is fuelled by above average population growth. For many years into the future, Muslim populations will be disproportionately young populations. The young are notoriously protagonists for reform and revolution. The Arab nations will have a large number of young people who are likely to spill into southern Europe looking for work. Young populations naturally spread outwards in seeking improved opportunities.

 

Modernisation is reconfiguring global politics along cultural lines. Common blood ties and beliefs are being used as a guide in a global identity crisis. As the Cold War ended, old feuds and disputes were resurrected. In the 1990s, regional conflicts replaced global conflict as the main locus of international relations. The end of the Cold War led to an attempt to recreate old regional economic organisations. The patterns of trade tend to follow the patterns of alliance amongst nations. In the Cold War, alignments followed along the lines of the superpower conflict. They now follow cultural alignments.

 

In the emerging global politics, the core states of the major civilisations are supplanting the two Cold War superpowers. Countries tend to bandwagon with countries of a similar culture and to balance against countries with which they lack cultural commonality. This is giving rise to a model dominated by “spheres-of-influence”. A core state can perform its ordering function because the cultural commonality of the member states leads them to recognise the leadership of the core state. When civilisations lack core states, the question of ordering does pose a problem. It results in a system without order (or a chaotic system).

 

The West will try to remain pre-eminent amongst cultures. However, non-Western societies, having gained independence, may wish to free themselves from Western cultural and economic hegemony. Islam and China have long cultural histories, and may wish to assert themselves. These issues are increasing important on the international agenda. Global economic growth has widely diffused weapons capabilities. The high entry cost to conventional forces may compel non-Western nations to pursue the cost-effective option of WMDs. The Nuclear threat to the West has not gone away – it is now in different hands. Weapons proliferation is where the Islamic-Sinic connection has been more tangible in recent years. The proliferation of WMDs has risen to the top of Western security concerns. The West promotes non-proliferation, which is interpreted in the non-Western world as a desire to retain a monopoly on WMDs.

 

Economic growth in Asia acted as a balance against US attempts to promote democratisation. Human Rights have been downgraded as an issue with China in order not to offend the Chinese Government. Too much pressure on Human Rights issues might endanger the trade relations between the West and East Asia. The limited ability of the West to advance Human Rights as an issue is shown in the UN.

 

The current discord between the West and Islam is best seen as a core state conflict. The causes of the conflict flow from the inherent nature of the civilisations that they represent. Recent trends in Islam have been anti-Western in direction. The West is generally seen as being materialist, arrogant, repressive, brutal, and decadent. The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism; it is Islam as a civilisational form.

 

The economic changes in Asia, however, could bring about a Cauldron of Civilisations. The economic development of East Asia is being translated into changed military and diplomatic capabilities. This will affect the established balance of power. East Asia sees the convergence of six civilisations – Japanese, Sinic, Orthodox, Buddhist, Muslim, and Western. The multi-power, multi-civilisational nature of East Asia makes it an area of great potential instability.

 

In East Asia, the residue of the Cold War is being exacerbated by historical rivalries and conflicts. Relations between the Sinic nations and the US are becoming increasingly antagonistic. US opinion towards East Asia has hardened in recent years. The Japanese economy has a distinctive character. It is uniquely modern and non-Western. The US and China have become increasingly antagonistic in the military sphere. In many ways, the position of both sides was driven domestically. This reflects the changed power relations between Asia and the US. Asian societies are now encouraged by each other to act collectively and to support each other diplomatically.

 

East Asia could develop in one of many ways in the coming decades. China could become dominant if the economic growth continues, if it retains its cohesion, and if there are no succession struggles. China’s history would propel it to become a hegemon. The dynamism of the Chinese economy is shifting influence into the hands of the Chinese. The reaction of other East Asian states could be along one of two lines:

1. To coalesce in the containment of the rising hegemon.

2. To bandwagon the emerging power by aligning with it.

It is in the interests of the US to act as a balance to the growing Chinese hegemon. This would imply a policy of containment, which may well involve conflict.

 

The rise of China will pose a major problem for Japan. In the absence of a major show of commitment from the US, Japan is likely to accommodate China. Chinese hegemony will reduce instability and conflict in East Asia. It will also reduce the influence of the West. The Chinese Confucian heritage (authority, order, and hierarchy) is likely to act as a counterbalance to democratisation.

 

The post-Cold War world lacks a dominant cleavage on a global scale. A world divided along civilisational grounds has three implications for the West:

1. We can only alter reality if we recognise it. Europe leads the US in recognising the new realities of the world.

2. An unwillingness to abandon old modes of thinking is likely to hold back the West. Cold War structures (e.g. NATO) may no longer be relevant.

3. The rise of other civilisations will challenge the hegemony of Western civilisation.

 

There is much to commend this way of thinking. The view of the new world order in civilisational terms is both novel and exciting. However, there are parts of the argument that don’t quite fit together. For example, Huntington sees “Europe” as a single entity. It is. And it isn’t. It is in that there is a high degree of co-ordination of the foreign policy followed by the European states. It isn’t in that the EU doesn’t behave like a nation-state because it isn’t one. This is a mistake that make in the US make about the EU. The EU is not a federal nation-state; it is a loose confederation of independent states who occasionally agree to act collectively in the foreign policy arena. This is why the EU can countenance the incorporation of two of Huntington’s civilisations (the Western and the Orthodox), and why it can consider the incorporation of a third civilisation (the Islamic). To this extent, the EU doesn’t fit into Huntington’s model.

 

However, because the model does not fit every situation doesn’t mean that we ought to reject it in its entirety. The civilisational approach is a useful start to considering international relations. It can be used to explain a number of conflicts within the contemporary world (e.g. in the Ukraine), but it also has its shortcomings. It is a useful tool for us to use, but not the only one. For this reason, I would recommend the book.

 

 

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

stephena@eufo.org

 

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