The Breaking Of Nations

THE EUROPEAN

FUTURES

OBSERVATORY

THE BREAKING OF NATIONS

Robert Cooper

ISBN 1-84354-231-5

I was attracted to this book for a number of reasons. To begin with, Robert Cooper is a much respected commentator on International Affairs. He is one of the UK’s most senior diplomats and was formerly a special adviser to Tony Blair on foreign policy. Merely by being at the centre of events at an important point in recent history ensures that we ought to listen to what Mr Cooper has to say. However, Mr Cooper does have much to say that ought to be heeded if we are to understand events in the contemporary world. In the context of our “America 2025” project, his book delivers an important conceptual model, which we will find of great use when undertaking the creation of the scenarios.

After a general introduction, the book is divided into three parts. The first part examines the condition of the world. Central to the thesis is that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the structure in which international relations were conducted changed. Part one sets out to map those changes and to suggest of what the new world order consists. Part two is an essay on twenty-first century diplomacy that originally started as a briefing for the Prime Minister. It has been extended and expanded for this book. Finally, part three examines the relationship between Europe and America. It was originally published as journal article, but was developed further for inclusion in this book. The three parts could quite easily be taken as separate pieces, but together they make up three different aspects of the current diplomatic scene.

Mr Cooper argues in Part One that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 is a pivotal point in world history. This may be an exaggeration, but he lays down quite a convincing argument that it isn’t. The main thesis is that, before 1989, international affairs were dominated by the Westphalian system of the “balance-of-power”. After 1989, with the end of the Cold War, the Westphalian system has broken down and a new system is emerging in its place.

In its place, is a new world order that consists of three paradigms – the Pre-Modern, the Modern, and the Post-Modern. The Pre-Modern world is characterised by a pre-state and post-imperial chaos. As modern economies move away from an industrial base, so the imperial imperative to secure the supply of raw materials recedes. This has created a legitimacy vacuum that is being filled by a religious imperative which runs counter to the governmental legacy of the Imperial Powers. The religious imperative is further complicated by the dissolution of state entities along tribal and ethnic lines. This just further exacerbates the chaos of the Pre-Modern world.

The Modern world represents the old world order that dissolved in 1989. In it the classical state retains the monopoly on violence. An important part of the modern world is the recognition of state sovereignty. The modern world is characterised by the balance-of-power system. International order is based upon the concepts of hegemony or balance. Security is found in a world of nation-states through the balance-of-power. China and India currently exhibit aspects of the Modern World, but also have a tendency to recede back to Pre-Modern Empires.

The Post-Modern world is one in which the state is collapsing, but into a post-modern order rather than a pre-modern anarchy. The post-modern does not rely upon the sovereignty of states, the balance-of-power, or the separation of foreign and domestic affairs. Security is achieved through confidence building measures. Borders become increasingly irrelevant in the post-modern world. It is governed by supra-national arrangements. The post-modern emphasises security through interdependence and transparency.

The post-modern state defines itself by its security policy. It is pluralist and inter-dependent, less centralised than the bureaucratic modern state, and more ordered than the anarchic pre-modern state. As the state becomes less dominating, state interest becomes less important in determining foreign policy. The economy tends to be located in the post-industrial service and information economy. In this, the individual is important and foreign policy becomes a continuation of domestic policy. A post-modern order requires post-modern states. In order to do so, the state needs to renounce its imperial ambitions.

Having outlined this tri-partite model, Mr Cooper then goes on to examine the relationships between the various actors in the model. I was quite attracted to the consideration of how a post-modern state conducts itself with modern states and pre-modern states. It is ironic that, in conducting itself with pre-modern states, the post-modern state may have to take on the characteristics of the imperial hegemon. This has a great deal of resonance with our America 2025 project. Could it be that the US appears as an imperial hegemon in its dealings with the pre-modern chaos of the Middle East, but is really a post-modern state trying to find security within the world?

After outlining the model in Part One, Mr Cooper looks at its application to the realities of diplomacy in Part Two. In the conduct of diplomacy in the twenty-first century, the main threats to the post-modern order are seen to be terrorism and WMD proliferation. Within this environment, Mr Cooper postulates five maxims by which diplomacy ought to be conducted:

1. Foreigners are different to us.

2. In the end, what matters is domestic politics.

3. Influencing foreigners is difficult.

4. Foreign policy is not only about interests.

5. Enlarge the context when you cannot reach agreement.

What stops these maxims from being of academic curiosity is the suspicion that, as part of a briefing to the Prime Minister, they are currently being acted upon in the formation of UK Foreign Policy. For this reason, we believe that they are important.

In the final part of the book, Mr Cooper examines the relationship between Europe and America. In many ways, this piece acts as a rebuttal to the arguments laid out by Mr Kagan (Click Here to see our notes on this piece). In doing so, Mr Cooper makes the standard argument concerning the “rule of law” against the “rule of might”, and in doing so raises an interesting point concerning legitimacy. It would appear that a key difference between Europe and America concerns the use of force. Mr Cooper suggests that Europe sees force as the guarantor of legitimacy, whilst America sees the use of force as the creator of legitimacy. This difference in perception is at the heart of the current divisions between Europe and America.

I have to say that I found Part One to be of far more benefit to me than Parts Two and Three. I quite warmed to the conceptual framework outlined in Part One, and I feel that it is a useful ay to view the world. I suspect that there are pools of pre-modernism in most post-modern states, just as there are likely to be pools of post-modernism in pre-modern states. However, as a general conceptual framework, I found the model to be very useful.

Parts Two and Three were of less use to me directly. I enjoyed reading them and I found the material interesting. It is just that they didn’t quite captivate me as Part One had, which left me feeling a little disappointed with them. Perhaps if I were to read them at another time, I would take much more from them?

On the whole, I do agree that this is an important book, and that it is one worth reading. I liked the style of the writing and I found that I could follow the arguments without a great deal of effort on my part. Parts of the book were very illuminating and parts of the book contributed greatly to my understanding of the world. For this reason, I would recommend the book.

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

stephena@eufo.org

EUFO Limited is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee, incorporated in England.

Reg Number 4947883.

Registered office; 6 Greenways Close, Ipswich, Suffolk IP1 3RB, United Kingdom.