THE EUROPEAN

FUTURES

OBSERVATORY

PARADISE AND POWER

(America And Europe In The New World Order)

 

Robert Kagan

 

ISBN 1-84354-177-7

 

 

Mr Kagan sets out his stall in the very first sentence of the book. We are told that: “It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world.” I think that, more than anything, it was this first sentence that drew me into the book.

 

We live at a time when many in Europe are seriously questioning the role of the USA in the world. This questioning of US leadership in world affairs has caused many in America to reconsider what the commitment of the US to world affairs ought to be. The rise of a unipolar system of international relations has also seen the increased willingness of the US to act unilaterally in world affairs. In taking up the book, I hoped to gain a deeper insight into this apparent rift that is developing between the US and its key supporters in Europe.

 

The book is, actually, quite short. At just over 100 pages, it is quite possible to read it in one sitting. Indeed, the first time that I read the book, I did just that. We could argue that the book is more in the nature of an essay. This might help us to understand the absence of chapters in the text. However, the book does flow, and is conveniently divided into eight sections. I would have preferred the structure of the book to have been given more prominence – possibly through an index – but that just reflects my own prejudices.

 

We are treated to a general introduction of the topic in the first section. In this, Mr Kagan examines the ways in which Europe and the US are moving apart. He reminds us that the reasons for the divide are deep and have been long in development. It is the case that the US and Europe have parted ways in assigning priorities to defence and foreign policy.

 

The Europeans see the US as having less patience with diplomacy and being willing to resort to the use of force. They see themselves as approaching problems with more subtlety, sophistication and indirection. They are tolerant of failure and adopt a patient approach. Not all Europeans have similar views. For example, the British tend to be more “American” in their approach than most Europeans. Equally, not all nations are monolithic – the French Gaullists are very different to the French Socialists. However, it is asserted that the US and Europe are fundamentally different today. The Democrats in the US have more in common with the Republicans in the US than they have with liberal movements in Europe.

 

Mr Kagan points out that the European approach (diplomacy, negotiation, consensus building) is quite new historically. The US has traditionally relied on force in diplomacy and taken a unilateral approach to the world. This partly reflects the ability of the US to influence events on the world stage. The Europeans now see the world through the eyes of a weaker power, and seek to constrain the actions of the stronger power.

 

From this introduction, Mr Kagan moves the argument on in the second section to consider what he calls ‘The Power Gap’. He notes that European military power has been in decline throughout the twentieth century. The League of Nations was the first attempt at moving beyond power politics. World War II almost destroyed the European nations as global powers. The US had hoped that Europe might be a “third force” to counter the USSR after 1945 (thus allowing the US to pull back from Europe). This didn’t happen. Instead, Europe fell into a state of strategic dependency on the US for 50 years. The Cold War created a tension between the US and Europe over burden sharing within NATO.

 

The Balkan Crises of the 1990s forced the US to continue to see Europe as a strategic priority, and gave NATO a post Cold War role. The EU held the promise of a “New Europe”, but as the EU has developed in the economic realm, it has not developed in the security realm. Economic power did not readily translate into strategic and diplomatic power because European voters are unwilling to fund a large military presence. The US, however, did maintain its levels of military spending, giving rise to ‘The Power Gap’. The Power Gap is an expression of the difference in military might between the US and the European nations.

 

The existence of The Power Gap gives rise to different psychologies of power and weakness, and issue explored in the third section. Mr Kagan holds that if strong powers view the world differently from weaker powers (they view risks differently, they define security differently, and they tolerate different levels of insecurity), then there is an obvious reason why there is a growing gap in strategic culture between the US and Europe. The Europeans see themselves as having a different perception of security to the US. They appear to be more willing to tolerate security threats.

 

However, a greater tolerance of threats can also lead to a denial of threats and complacency in the realms of security. Interestingly, Americans often talk about “security threats” whilst Europeans talk about “security challenges”. However, this gives scope for the US to misinterpret the actions of Europe. Different perceptions of threats are a manifestation of a weaker Europe and a relatively stronger US. Some of the difference is related to the power gap. The power gap has led Europe to become interested in building a world order where force and military might count for less than soft power and economic power.

 

One aspect of this disagreement translates into the issue of unilateralism. Europe is more committed to multilateralism than the US, but this might be a manifestation of the power gap. It is from this standpoint that a unilateral US is seen as a danger to world peace. The weaker Europeans naturally wish to constrain the unilateralism of the US.

 

This has led us to a state of Hyperpuissance – the imposition of US policy through hectoring and bullying – which Mr Kagan examines in part four. The policy of Hyperpuissance first came to the fore in the Clinton years, and the administration of Bush Jr continued this. After September 11^th, the US was not too concerned about operating through NATO. This allowed the US to operate without due regard for the “legal issues” that tended to constrain the European allies. It led many Europeans to conclude that the time had come to loosen the ties to the US.

 

The problem, from the US perspective, is that Europe does not want to be a military power. It has led some US observers to conclude that Europe just wishes to “free ride” the US security umbrella. The Europeans have a marked preference for welfare over defence spending. Europe has few ambitions as a military power, and is attempting to build a world order based upon law rather than force. The emphasis is on negotiation, diplomacy, commercial ties, and multilateral action - to create a Post-Modern paradise.

 

Mr Kagan considers further the Post-Modern paradise in part five of the book. Europe sees itself as living in a post-modern age resting upon international legitimacy rather than the balance of power. This relies on diplomacy, negotiation, patience, economic ties, political ties, and the use of inducements rather than confrontation. The integration of Europe is not based upon the balance of power. To the contrary, it has come about through the rejection of the use of military power. Many Europeans cannot see why the rest of the world cannot follow this example.

 

This is the heart of the divergence between Europe and the US. The US has the power and is willing to use it, unilaterally, if necessary. This constitutes a direct threat to the central mission of the EU. The EU is founded on the principle of the supremacy of international law. If the US flouts this, then the core of the EU is challenged. The role of law at the heart of the EU helps to explain why the EU has developed as an economic super-power, but not as a military power. The EU has the potential to assume a larger role on the world stage, if it wants to.

 

However, to exercise this role, the EU has to work in the world that America has made – an issue covered in the final three parts of the book. The current position in Europe (weak militarily and driving towards integration) is very much the product of US foreign policy throughout the twentieth century. The evolution of Europe could not have happened without the US security guarantee. This is ironic, as the American security guarantee has allowed Europe to develop a system by which it can do away with military power. The paradox is that the US facilitated the move of Europe into a post-modern world by foregoing a move into the post-modern world itself.

 

The post-modern world contains many paradoxes. Europe is post-modern in its relations internally, but it is not post-modern with its relations to other areas in the world. In many ways, the price that the US has exacted for the European security guarantee has been a tendency to act unilaterally, and without answering to anyone. However, in the post-Cold War world, the Europeans are starting to question this price. The end of the Cold War has started to see the weakening of the concept of “the West”.

 

The interests of the US in bolstering Europe in the Cold War have changed. The strategic need for the concept of “the West” has diminished greatly. The realisation of much of post WWII policy meant that a new strategy had to emerge. This started with a change in the nature of US policy towards Europe. The US started to be less generous. It started to concede less to international public opinion, to consult allies less, and to act as it saw fit. This is coupled with calls for fewer US overseas involvements of all kinds.

 

The gap between the US and Europe may not close in the foreseeable future. Few Americans lament their inability to enter the European post-modern world. We just have to accept the decoupling of Europe from the US. However, will Europe do this by bolstering their military presence? Mr Kagan feels that it ought to.

 

All in all, I quite enjoyed this book. Once one accepts that Mr Kagan has adopted a partisan view, and that the book contains no pretensions of objectivity and impartiality, one can sit back and really enjoy the book. It is well written, very well thought out, and presents a well rehearsed plea for Europe to bolster an ‘American Empire’.

 

Sadly, we didn’t find the argument that convincing for two reasons. First, we find the model incomplete. Mr Kagan does not allow in his model what we would consider as due regard for the diplomatic successes of Europe or due regard for the military failures of the US. Any model that we would find convincing would have to be able to accommodate these two features. Second, Mr Kagan has not accounted enough for the changes in the military landscape over the past twenty years. It is our view that we are now living in an era of ‘netwar’ (in all of its senses) and asymmetrical warfare. US military policy is geared to counter the challenge of a monolithic opponent engaged in conventional war. Unfortunately, such potential opponents are unlikely to test the American Military. A European view would possibly regard Mr Kagan as exhorting the EU nations to be as wasteful of military resources as is the US.

 

Despite being unconvinced by the book, we would encourage the reader not to discard it. Mr Kagan represents an important strand of current US thinking towards Europe, and he is worth taking account of for this reason alone. It is a bonus that the book has a logically sound argument that is presented to us in a clear style. This made it a pleasure to read.

 

 

 

Stephen Aguilar-Millan

stephena@eufo.org

 

Victoria Freestone

victoriaf@eufo.org

 

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